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I. THE INTRODUCTION 
A. AN OVERVIEW 
In the immediate aftermath of the devastating terrorist assault on the United 
States, President George W. Bush told U.S. citizens that the country faced “the first war 
of the twenty-first century.”  A few days later, Vice President Dick Cheney vowed that 
the coming conflict would be “global in scope.”  Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
said that the international campaign would be waged on many fronts—from military 
strikes, better intelligence, and stronger banking regulations to more-effective 
international cooperation in policing against terrorists.  Perhaps more significant than 
Bush’s statement but less well understood: the first war of the twenty-first century is also 
the first major war in the age of global terrorism.1 
Entering a war suggests one look at the 3 principles, largely shaped by Christian 
moral philosophers and ethicists of the 17th and 18th century, embodied in Just War 
Theory:  (1)  Entering a war justly (defending oneself from an aggressor); (2) once in 
war, fighting it justly (via moral and ethical codes); and (3) leaving the war-torn area in a 
just manner (helping to rebuild infrastructure so as to prevent harm to the greater 
population in the foreseeable future).   
While the early Christian ethicists were more concerned with constraints that 
allowed them to fight with a clear conscience, the conduct of war itself was further 
clarified by a separate secular group of moral and religious philosophers intent on 
maintaining order among the common people. This Jus in Bello principle, would, over 
the next 300 years, prove to be the undoing of Just War Theory: it appears that no war in 
the last few centuries has been fought completely justly.   
The power to bear arms, much like the power to vote, was a jealously guarded 
privilege.  Arguments can certainly be made that this was the way of Classical Greece, 
but the Western Europeans, namely United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, were 
enthralled with the organized industry of warfare, often studying and asking the mundane 
                                                 
1 Campbell, Kurt M, Globalization’s First War?, Washington Quarterly, 25:1, pp. 7-14, Winter 2002. 
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questions pertaining to the plunder and ransoming of prisoners.2  Questions like “How 
long can I torture an individual?  Is it fair to execute for no reason?  What if they 
surrender?  What about rape or dismemberment?” These inquiries into the conduct of 
warfare, and the establishment and disagreement on the full spectrum of this conduct, set 
the stage for the remainder of this thesis.  
Supposedly, Just War Doctrine has provided a framework to aid in the moral 
decision-making that world leaders need to conduct wars, but does it ever survive beyond 
the opening rounds of the first engagement?  Even when wars are begun justly, have there 
been any that have been conducted justly throughout?  Has there been a war in the last 
100 years that adhered to all tenets of Just War Theory and its subparts and thus been 
truly just?  Or has the centuries-old Just War Theory failed to evolve with today’s world? 
Has its relevance now been lost on political leaders? 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What is Just War Theory? 
What historical precedents/analysis validate(s) or dispute conventional Just War 
Theory thinking? 
 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY: 
The scope includes: (1) a review of Just War Theory and its doctrine, statutes 
according to religious law, and acceptable organizational concepts, (2) an analysis of the 
issues, problems associated with Just War Theory, and (3) literature review regarding 
possible solutions.  The thesis is an assessment of currently adopted methods and beliefs 




                                                 
2 Howard, Michael; Andreaopoulous, George J.; and Shulman, Mark R. The Laws of War. Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1994. 
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The methodology includes the following steps: 
1. Conduct a search of documents currently published on Just War Theory  
2. Analyze the issues associated with the centuries-old philosophy 
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II. JUST WAR THEORY 
Very little forethought has been given by scholars to globalization’s impact on 
large-scale global war3.  With more and more of the world becoming interconnected, 
predominance for security to protect future global economies is inevitable.  Rogue state 
actors seek to undermine the shrinking of this interconnectedness and opt instead to repel 
globalization.  These terrorists attempt to do this with a means of warfare that grossly 
contradicts any type of civility.  Today’s war is global in scope, and the strongest of 
political leaders are forced to evaluate how to combat terrorism that plays without rules. 
A reasonable moral code must allow for effective action within the real world.  
Michael Walzer argues fiercely for maintaining a vigilant commitment to Just War 
Theory but is acutely mindful of the need to provide security for individuals and, 
particularly, communities.  For example, he argues for modifying civil liberties if they are 
incompatible with the effectiveness of necessary police work in the war against 
terrorism.4   
International terrorists are changing the way political leaders conduct defense.  
The Bush Administration has opted for a method of preemption of terrorist acts. 
Preemption is not necessarily a new option.  The United States has contemplated 
preemption military against weapons of mass destruction several times, but has not taken 
military action.5  In the 1940s and 1950s, the US considered attacking Soviet and 
Chinese nuclear capabilities but did not act.6  This Bush administration has repeatedly 
cited the naval quarantine imposed by President John F. Kennedy on Cuba in 1962 as an 
impressive example of effective pre-emptive action.  Additionally, in 1994, US officials 
considered a conventional weapon preemptive strike on a North Korean nuclear reactor to 
                                                 
3 Lexis/Nexis and Proquest search conducted on 4 December 2005 turned up only 7 articles that met 
the criteria of Just War Doctrine or Theory and Globalization. 
4 Walzer, Michael Arguing About War, New York, NY: Yale University Press 2004. 
5 Bunn, Elaine.  Premptive Action:  When, How and to What Effect?  Strategic Forum, July 2003, P 1-
8. 
6 William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United 
States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64," International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/2001), 
54-99. 
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eliminate the removal of fuel rods that could have propelled catastrophic radioactive 
plumes and most certainly could have led to conventional war with South Korea.  
Luckily, this war was averted by a 1994 Agreed Framework negotiation.7 The United 
States is not the only country that has considered or carried out preemptive actions.  The 
classic case is the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility because of concern 
that Iraq would use the reactor to produce highly enriched uranium for a weapons 
program. (Iran had previously bombed Osirak, in the opening days of the Iran-Iraq war in 
1980, lightly damaging the facility.)8 After its 1981 attack, Israel claimed it was 
exercising its inherent right of self-defense, consistent with Article 51 of the United 
Nations (UN) charter. The UN Security Council censured Israel, and the U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN spoke against Israel for its action.9  Michael Waltzer, in his 1977 
book Just and Unjust Wars, drew the line between legitimate and illegitimate first strikes 
not at the point of imminent attack but at the point of sufficient threat--a phrase he 
recognized as "necessarily vague." He meant it to cover three things: "a manifest intent to 
injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a 
general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly 
magnifies the risk."10  
Further, China has set up enhanced firewalls for local internet users and has 
targeted Ghana and Nigeria with an intelligence gathering net and the United Kingdom 
and Spain have blanketed their public transit systems with audio and video surveillance 
devices.  However, the motivation underlying the Bush Administrations emphasis on 
preemption barely addresses the surface of a larger issue with regard to Just War Theory: 
its applicability in the 17th Century and today in the 21st.  In fact, the debate has been 
much more about the ethical implications of preemption and prevention than about the 
                                                 
7 Ashton B. Carter, "Three Crises with North Korea," prepared testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, February 4, 2003. 
8 Rebecca Grant, "Osirak and Beyond," Air Force Magazine, August 2002, 74. Grant cites a statement 
issued by the official Iraqi news agency following the 1980 Iranian bombing of Osirak: "The Iranian people 
should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not intended to be used against Iran, but against the 
Zionist entity." 
9 Anthony Clark Arend, "International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force," The 
Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 89. 
10 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 81. 
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war itself.  The US and the coalition of allied forces have been so concerned with 
adhering to ethical norms for the conduct of war that they never fully addressed whether 
or not the war is just.  The underlying question must still be asked: Is the war against 
Terrorism Just? Further, is Just War Theory even relevant any more? 
Legendary philosophers such as Augustine, Aquinas, Suarez, Vattel, Vitorio and 
Hugo Grotius offer some of the most influential perspectives on the ethics of war and 
peace.  Most of the rules created by these philosophers have since been transcribed into 
international laws such as The Hague and Geneva Conventions, thereby setting a tone for 
international discourse and limits for reasoned debate.  The “just war tradition” deals with 
the historical body of rules or agreements applied (or at least existing) in various wars 
across the ages.11   
Just War Theory is broken down into three parts: 1) jus ad bellum, the justice of 
resorting to war in the first place; 2) jus in Bello, just conduct within war; and 3) jus post 
bellum, the justice of peace agreements and termination of war.    Because this thesis 
focuses on the continuing threat that terrorists and stateless extremists pose, it will not 
discuss the third element of Just War Theory, jus post bellum. 
The next step is to break this theory down into its constituent parts. 
 
A. JUS AD BELLUM  
These rules on jus ad bellum are addressed to heads of state that start wars and are 
ultimately held accountable for the conduct of their respective nations. Each of the 
following criteria must be satisfied to override the strong presumption against the use of 
force. 
Just Cause:  Force may be used only to correct a grave, public evil (i.e., self-
defense from external attack, the protection of innocents, and punishment for 
wrongdoing).  Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars argues that resorting to war can 
be justified only in order to resist aggression: unjustified and harmful violence.  The key 
                                                 
11 "Just War Theory," by Alexander Moseley, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/, 14 Aug 2004. 
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principle underlying just cause is inherent in State and human rights as set forth by the 
United Nation’s Universal Declaration (appendix 1).   
Legitimate Authority: Only duly constituted public authorities may use deadly 
force or wage war. 
Right Intention: Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that 
purpose. 
Probability of Success: Arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a case where 
disproportionate measures are required to achieve success. 
Proportionality:  The overall destruction expected from the use of force must be 
outweighed by the good to be achieved. 
Last Resort: Force may be used only after all peaceful alternatives have been 
seriously tried and exhausted.  One wants to ensure that something as serious as war is 
declared when it is the only alternative to effectively punish or deter aggression.12 
Just War Theory insists all these qualifications are equal.  Each must be fulfilled 
in order for a war to be justified.   
 
B. JUS IN BELLO  
The Just-War Tradition seeks also to curb the violence of war through restraint on 
armed combat between the contending parties by imposing the following moral 
standards: 
Discrimination: Civilians may not be the object of direct attack, and military 
personnel must take due care to avoid and minimize indirect harm to civilians. 
Proportionality: In the conduct of hostilities, efforts must be made to attain 
military objectives with no more force than is militarily necessary, and to avoid 
disproportionate collateral damage to civilian life and property. 
                                                 
12 Stanford’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
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Right Intention: Even in the midst of conflict, the aim of political and military 
leaders must be peace and justice, so that acts of vengeance and indiscriminate violence, 
whether by individuals, military units or governments, are forbidden. 
Underlying jus ad bellum and jus in Bello is aggression.  Aggression is the formal 
ruling that allows countries to defend themselves and wage war in the event that they feel 
threatened.  Without aggression, essentially there is no justification for war.  Aggressions, 
described by the early clerics, were those traits of warfare that infringed upon another 
country’s or tribe’s way of life. Walzer defines aggression as the name we give the crime 
of war.13 The wrong the aggressor commits is to force men and women to risk their lives 
for the sake of their rights.  The wrong is to confront them with choice:  your rights or 
(some of) your lives.14  Aggression is unique because it is the only crime that states can 
commit against other states:  everything else is, as it were, a misdemeanor. 
                                                 
13 Walzer, Michael Just and Unjust Wars:   A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, New York, NY: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1977. 
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III. HISTORY’S LESSONS 
In the course of hundreds of years of political invention, the tradition boiled down 
to a set of rules established in the 16th Century15 as alluded to in the previous chapter.  
Because theorists wrote from the perspective of the era in which they lived, and because 
the 16th Century presented a plethora of problems not seen today and vice versa, it makes 
sense to focus on specific examples of warfare of the last one hundred years.  What 
follows are examples of clear disregard for Just War Tradition principles: the Russo-
Japanese War, World War I, World War II, the 1st Gulf War, the Kosovo Intervention and 
today’s Global War on Terror. 
Today, the most common types of conflict are revolutions, civil wars and coups d’ 
etat16.  Today there are fewer nation states with distinct and declared armies lining up on 
battlefields to settle their differences. The world today is a world without traditional rules.  
The distinction between combatants and non-combatants has become even more difficult 
for politicians and Just War theory adherents to make. Because of the stateless nature of 
terrorist entities, Just War gives less guidance than it used to give. In fact, political 
leaders may be ignoring Just War altogether.  An analysis of specific acts of aggression in 
the last 100 years should provide a reasonable framework. 
A good starting point is the Russian Imperialism that ended in East Asia in 1905 
when Russia lost the Russo-Japanese War.   
 
A. RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM 
In the late 19th and early 20th century, Western countries were fighting for 
territory, influence and trade as Japan was emerging as a modern great power.  Japan was 
intent on expanding its span of influence and had in the previous decade won wars in 
Taiwan, Korea and China.  In 1903, it had its sights on Port Arthur in southern 
Manchuria.  Japan declared it an absolute necessity to maintain control of the seas and the 
                                                 
15 Mark Douglas, “Changing the Rules: Just War Theory in the 21st Century,” Theology Today, Jan 
2003, Page 59. 
16 Ibid. 
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seizure of Port Arthur would give it a stronghold for mainland fighting in Russia and 
allow for expansion. 17   
Russia was a great power and succeeded with its many Czars in claiming territory 
among the northern land edges of the world.  Russia amassed a military force 10 times 
that of the Japanese and was very competent at protecting the seas.  But with the small 
victories propelling its confidence and its desire to be a great power, Japan launched an 
all-out attack on the people in and around Port Arthur for 24 months.  Around the 
mainland, Japan drove ordinary citizens away from their homes into Port Arthur, which 
was surrounded by water on three sides.  Japan then launched the first offensive mine-
fielding within the port so that no Russian ships could enter or leave.  This brought 
widespread famine to the area; and the bombardment continued.  Finally in 1905, Russia 
surrendered to the Japanese    
Japan’s victory and method of warfare was met with shock in the Western world 
and Asia.  The world’s major powers looked with condemnation at the atrocities created 
by the innovative evolution in maritime warfare.  Never before had mines been used as an 
offensive weapon.  This change would make modern naval warfare even bloodier and 
deadlier just nine years later in the muddy trenches of Europe during World War I. 
 
B. WORLD WAR I 
During World War I, German war plans were still based on the tactics of 
Hannibal of Cannae.18 That is to say, German war plans were developed on the 
foundations of order, merit and circumstance. They did not allow room for innovation 
and flexibility. This Great War, as it came to be known, showed scholars that the 
twentieth-century military experience was different; rendering the final blow to the ideal 
of ancient glory and bringing into question many of the earlier-negotiated Hague 
Conventions.19 These conventions are mentioned throughout the text. 
                                                 
17 Pipes, Richard, Russia Under the Old Regime, Penguin Books, 1974. 
18 Dawson, Doyne The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World, 
Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 190. 
19 Howard, Michael; Andreaopoulous, George J.; and Shulman, Mark R. The Laws of War. Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1994. 
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The first major act of the Great War came in August 1914 as Germany invaded 
and occupied neutral Belgium to gain strategic dominance and position over France for 
later in the war.  Just seven years earlier, Germany sat as one of the drafting powers for 
the Hague Convention V on Neutrality in Land War, whose Article 1 said:  “The territory 
of neutral Powers is inviolable.”20  This violation would prove to be the beginning of 
many. 
In 1915, a new weapon of war was used when Germany released asphyxiating gas 
from cylinders along a 6km front.  All in all, nearly 100,000 troops died from gaseous 
weapons during the First World War despite the fact that Germany was party to the 1899 
Hague Declaration on Asphyxiating Gases which said “The contracting Powers agree to 
abstain from diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”  This was a clear violation 
of the Jus in Bello principle and one for which the Germans showed no remorse. The 
Germans used the gas once again in May 1915 in Poland and the allied forces used them 
in the Battle of Loos in 1915.  There were land violations of war doctrine; naval 
violations of agreed warfare doctrine were also evident. 
At the opening of the war, the world’s most powerful Navy, the British Navy, 
exercised its might in declaring a maritime blockade that was as harsh as anything 
experienced during the Napoleonic Wars.  A British declaration in 1914 labeled the entire 
North Sea a military area21 and that “merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all 
countries, fishing craft and all other vessels, will be exposed to the greatest dangers from 
mines that it has been necessary to lay and from warships searching vigilantly by night 
and day for suspicious craft.” 22  The British government justified this action by declaring 
it retaliation--its own fishing vessels suffered on trade routes indiscriminately mined by 
merchant ships flying neutral flags. 
                                                 
20 Orvik, Nils, The Decline of Neutrality, 1914-1941:  With Special Reference to the United States and 
the Northern Neutrals, 2d ed. (London:  Cass, 1971). 
21 Ibid, p. 111. 
22 Letter of British foreign office to British ambassador in Washington, Nov 3, 1914, in Naval War 
College, International Law Documents (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), 52. 
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In 1915, the German Navy followed suit, declaring it would indiscriminately 
destroy any merchant vessel in the North Sea around the British Isles.23  And, since both 
parties, the Brits and Germans, often flew neutral flags to sail incognito, neither country 
recognized neutrality for the duration of the war.  The larger underlying factor was the 
disturbance of the trade routes; the German ambassador said “my people are dying of 
starvation through the destruction of legitimate trade with foreign neutral countries.”24  In 
January of 1917, Germany declared unrestricted submarine warfare against all vessels in 
the North Sea to preempt further suffering.  The ambassador went on to declare that “all 
ships met in this military zone will be sunk.” 
Innocent and neutral targets were attacked during this North Sea fiasco.  In 1918, 
the hospital ship Llandovery Castle was torpedoed and sunk by German U-Boat 86, and 
there was additionally the murder of eleven survivors of sunken German U-27 by the 
British Q-ship Baralong in 1915.25  Both these are examples of violations of the 
principles of Jus in Bello as was the further development of strategic airpower in 1918.26   
One starts to see the underlying theme develop…that adherence to just war tradition had 
fallen to the wayside.   
The German Air Force was ahead of its time in 1917 with development of a long 
range bomber nicknamed the “Giant” which mirrored closely that of the World War II era 
B-29.  With that development came another type of warfare that violated the tenets of 
Just War:  untargeted bombing.  In June 1917, the German Luftwaffe planned a raid on 




                                                 
23 Ibid, p. 112. 
24 German ambassador to the secretary of state, Feb 15, 1915, Ibid., 54-55. 
25 Schwengler, Walter. Volkerrecht, versailler Vertag und Auslieferungsfrage:  Die Strafverfolgung 
wegen Kriegsverbrechen als Problem des Freidensschlusses 1919/1920 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1982), 348. 
26 It is very important to note that the flagrant disregard for Just War principles fed off itself and 
allowed opposing countries to continue to disregard the laws and instead set in motion a cycle of reprisals 
and counter reprisals that continued throughout the war. 
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bombing technology was so crude, an East End council school was destroyed instead, 
causing the death of many students.27  Twenty years later, history would repeat itself in 
World War II 
. 
C. WORLD WAR II 
Pope Pius XII, in an address to the United Nations in 1952, said “The enormous 
violence of modern warfare means that it can no longer be regarded as a reasonable, 
proportionate means for settling conflicts.”28  His concern at the time was the possibility 
of nuclear warfare.  Without humankind exercising restraint, he argued, moral judgments 
cease to exist.  As was the case during WWII, atomic bombing set the precedent of a war 
without limits.  This could be a gross overstatement however, as it can be argued that 
although the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan took a tremendous 
human toll, this bombing saved an even greater number of aggregate lives (Japanese and 
US combined) than had this war been allowed to continue as it was being fought.  There 
is another side though, one that suggests Japan was close to surrendering:  “On May 5, 
May 12 and June 7, the Office of Strategic Services (the predecessor to the Central 
Intelligence Agency), reported Japan was considering capitulation.  Further messages 
came on May 18, July 7, July 13 and July 16.”29 Further, Alperowitz points out “The 
standing United States demand for ‘unconditional surrender’ directly threatened not only 
the person of the Emperor but such central tenets of Japanese culture as well.”30  Mr. 
Alperowitz concludes by quoting the Chief of Air Forces, General LeMay, “The war 
would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic 
bomb.  PRESS INQUIRY:  You mean that sir?  Without the Russians and the Bomb?  
LeMay:  The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.”31  In the end, 
on one day during the dropping of Fat Boy, according to U.S. estimates, 60,000 to 70,000 
                                                 
27 Spaight, J.M., Air Power and War Rights, (London:  Longmans, Green, 1924), pp. 220. 
28 Tremblay, Rodrique, Just War Theory, The Humanist, May/June 2003, p16. 
29 Alperowitz, Gar, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, Knopf, NY 1995, p16. 
30 Ibid, p36. 
31 Ibid, p334. 
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people were killed or missing as a result of the bomb.32 This example of a war without 
limits provides further evidence that political leaders and war fighting commanders have 
moved away from the adherence of Just War Tradition…in fact, they are ignoring it 
altogether. 
As part of the jus in Bello criterion, civilians are not to be the direct focus of 
hostility.  WWII violated this logic in the pursuit of the greater good.  According to Just 
War Theory, legitimate war is limited war.33 This violation of limited war extends from 
Dresden (where hundreds of Allied bombers released a firestorm of bombs killing 
135,000 people and demolishing 80 percent of the city) to the fire bomb raids on Tokyo.  
It is worth noting that the attacks on Tokyo were more demoralizing for the Japanese than 
the actual fires, although also consequential.  To know that the US could reach its soil 
and drop bombs was worse than the act of death by fire.  East Asian studies suggest that, 
in the mind of the Japanese, saving face and honor are far more important than the 
outcome of a given conflict.  The fact that Major Jimmie Doolittle and his Raider flying 
squadron reached the mainland in effect crippled the Japanese military’s will to fight.   
Many critics from the 1940’s argue whether or not the atomic bomb should have 
been used to end World War II.  They contend that any alternative was preferable to 
unleashing “Fat Man” and “Little Boy.” Others assert that only the bomb, used in the way 
that it was, could have ended the war. Above all, they argue, it saved countless American 
lives. American GIs, who had been shipped halfway around the world to invade Japan 
after Germany surrendered, were elated. The bomb also precluded a Soviet invasion of 
Japan and gave the United States the upper hand in the postwar world. “Let there be no 
mistake about it,” Truman later wrote, “I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and 
never had any doubt that it should be used.”34 
It is important, for perspective, to point out that the total loss of life in World War 
II was nearly 44 million, of whom 11 million were citizens or residents of Allied nations.  
                                                 
32 Encarta Encyclopedia, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. 
 
33 J. Bryan Hehir, The Lessons of World War II, Commonweal v122, p9-10 Aug 18, 1995. 
34 Microsoft Encarta, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. 
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Nearly 300,000 American lives were lost in direct conflict, a little over 400,000 in all.  
The argument still exists among just war theorists that 110,000 deaths combined between 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was far less than the human toll of allied and opposing forces 
had the war continued.  However, there is still no evidence that all tenets of Just War 
Theory were adhered to, and again, this war was another example of an unjust war.  Are 
there examples of others?  What about Gulf War I? 
 
D. PERSIAN GULF I 
On the 2nd of August, 1990, after the Kuwait government had refused to forgive a 
debt of 80 billion dollars owed it by the government of Iraq, Kuwait City was overrun by 
nearly 150,000 Iraqi troops under the reign of Saddam Hussein.    Iraq’s withdrawal from 
Kuwait, completely, immediately, and without condition, and security and stability of the 
Gulf35  was the Charter imposed on Saddam Hussein by the Council of the United 
Nations the day after the siege.  In effect, the UN Council had demanded that Saddam 
Hussein withdraw his forces from Kuwaiti land and return to its own borders without 
negotiation.  Declared by Legitimate Authority36, the siege to oust Kuwait from the Iraqi 
Empire was supported by an unprecedented UN solidarity, based on the principle of 
collective self-defense, twelve Security Council resolutions and, on the ground in the 
Gulf, 28 nations from six continents.  As a Last Resort37, the US Secretary of State James 
Baker had more than 200 meetings, ten diplomatic missions, and six congressional 
appearances, and traveled over 100,000 miles to talk with members of the United 
Nations, the Arab League and the European Union. 38  There was a courtesy phone call 
between Secretary Baker to the Soviets one hour before the air war began, and President 
Gorbachev requested an additional hour to try a last chance effort to negotiate with 
Baghdad.  Secretary Baker turned down the request and recalled in a personal interview 
that “it was too late.39”  Militarily, there was no retreat. Ample time had been given over 
                                                 
35 US Department of State Dispatch, Feb 4, 1991 v2 n5 p67. 
36 Capitalized because this is a principle within the Jus ad bellum construct.  See page 6 for sub-parts. 
37  Ibid. 
38 US Department of State Dispatch, Feb 4, 1991 v2 n5 p67. 
39 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/baker/2.html, November 2005. 
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the course of 18 months for the Iraqi regime to adhere to the UN demands.  A last ditch 
effort through the Soviets was desperation at best.  The 12 years after this war further 
validate that the Iraqi regime had no intention of negotiating with UN demands.  These 
factors represent the many justifications in support of Jus ad Bellum.   What follows are 
the results and violations of Jus ad Bello. 
A UN Study in 1991 found that 567,000 Iraqi children under the age of 5 died 
from malnutrition exacerbated by the sanctions imposed by the UN on Iraq since 1990.40  
Using high-altitude bombing from B-52 Stratofortresses, cluster bombs and 15, 000 
pound “daisy-cutters”, the Allied action left in its wake the destruction of electricity 
networks and the devastation of water purification plants.  In fact, a report of the UN 
envoy in 1991 disclosed “Iraqi infrastructure has been reduced to the stone age.” 41   A 
Pentagon report stated “at least 5% of our cluster bombs failed to detonate on impact, and 
instead detonated after greater than a week and often when picked up by playing 
children.” 
In short, the Allies held others to moral criteria that they did not always follow 
themselves.  They imposed risk on others but refused to accept the risk themselves; hence 
the high-altitude, high-variance bombing raids.  The media played an important role in 
keeping information minimal, which is the opposite of the role most people expect it to 
play.  They made no mention of bloodshed, wounds or casualties on television42; even to 
this day the media do not typically show the horrific nature of war.  Specifically in the 
first Gulf War there is no documented video footage of Allied forces suffocating 
entrenched Iraqi soldiers by bulldozing tons of sand into and over their bunkers. 
Just War Theory is prospective, not retrospective.43  In other words, the tenets of 
just war ought to be planned for in advance of war and not simply argued after the fact.  
As it relates today, this doctrine focuses on causes, means, and ends of war.  There are 
two points worth making about the first Gulf War:  1. It provides a provisional and                                                  
40 Scheinin, Richard, When is a War Just?, San Jose Mercury News, Sep 22, 2001, p1F-2F. 
41 Achar, Gilbert, Is NATO’s Onslaught a “Just War”?, Monthly Review (New York, NY) June 1999. 
42 Callahan, Sidney, Confronting the Generals, Commonweal, v125, Sept 1998. 
43 Walzer, Michael Notes from an Israel Journal:  What the students taught the teacher about just and 
unjust warts, The New Republic, Sept 5, 1983 v189 p 13. 
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limited endorsement of the Afghanistan war; advocating for the withdrawal and 
elimination of another warring state: Taliban is to Afghanistan as Iraq was to Kuwait; and 
2. It reinforces prudential arguments for the extension of the Global War on Terror to 
other settings, most relevantly Iraq in 2003, clarifying that harboring of terrorism is 
aggression under common-day definition. 44  Iraq for years in coordination with Syria, 
Lebanon, and Iran has invested a great deal of money into terrorist training camps that 
serve to undermine the Globalized world.  This is really a scholarly debate.  The Bush 
doctrine argues for preemption due to the threat of aggression.  Does this doctrine 
abrogate the tenets of Just War theory?  Does it matter when just war theory has never 
really been adhered to?  It is important to continue with further examples such as Kosovo, 
Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
E. KOSOVO (OTHERWISE KNOWN AS YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION PLAN) 
Not since WWII had the military might of international allied partners been used 
to intervene militarily for purely humanitarian purposes.  That all changed in 1999 when 
CNN brought to people’s living rooms full-color atrocities (e.g. mass graves, gross 
famine, and slaughtering) that the UN and the US representatives did not turn their backs 
on.  UN and NATO leaders anticipated this event as the beginning of ethnic cleansing of 
1.5 million ethnic Albanians.  Today, while the trials still continue in the Hague and all 
the stories have yet to come to the surface, documented evidence shows that 640,000 
were forced to flee from their homes, and 780,000 were unaccounted for (although some 
question the validity of the reporting documents, which were never substantiated).  
Because of the unsuccessful negotiations of the late President Milosevic, and the rest of 
the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, in Paris and his reluctance to sign the agreement 
restoring autonomy and order to Kosovans, NATO intensified its air strikes. The targets 
of the attacks now included bridges, railroads, oil and electricity facilities, and factories 
throughout the FRY, including downtown Belgrade and other cities.   
                                                 
44 Falk, Richard, In Defense of ‘Just War’ Thinking, The Nation, Dec 24, 2001, p23. 
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Justification in Righting a Grievous Wrong was evident.45  In this case, the 
righting of the grievous wrong was in ending the mass butchering that was alleged to be 
happening within the borders of Serbia.  The Serbs felt they were acting in self-defense, 
although proportionality certainly was disregarded as the conflict continued to escalate, 
so some doubt still exists as to the validity of the claim of the 780,000 Kosovans 
unaccounted for.  Milosevic, on the other hand, was just trying to keep his country from 
fracturing due to rebel “ethnic” Albanians in country.  The larger issue underlying the 
Kosovan War is: why did the Allies intervene here?  Why not in the Sudan, East Timor, 
or later on Somalia?   
According to one of the tenets of Just War, armed force must be the last resort.  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for further economic sanctions; however the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wanted to engage quickly in halting the action 
militarily and did not exhaust all forms of non-military forms of coercion.46 
Legitimate Authority47 claims that war must not be declared by public or private 
groups but by sovereign or legitimate authorities.  In this case, NATO is a qualified, 
legitimate authority with many nation states where each nation state played an active role.  
However, President Bill Clinton committed military personnel without the approval of 
the US Congress.  By contrast, both Presidents Johnson and Bush Sr. sought 
congressional approval before sending troops to Vietnam and the first Persian Gulf War, 
respectively.  In fact, virtually all Presidents of the United States in the 20th century 
violated the Constitution by making war without a formal Congressional declaration, 
further providing evidence that the U.S. did not engage in a clearly just war in the 20th 
century. 
The concept of proportionality requires that we ask the question:  did the bombing 
raids assist in the cessation of genocide or propagate it further? As NATO bombing 
began, Milosevic intensified his mass killings as a retaliatory measure.  As the bombings 
continued, Serbian assaults on ethnic Albanians intensified, with police, paramilitary 
                                                 
45 Capitalized because this is a principle within the Jus ad bellum construct.  See page 6 for sub-parts. 
46 Colson, Charles Does Kosovo Pass the Just-War Test?, Christianity Today, May 24, 1999, p96. 
47 Capitalized because this is a principle within the Jus ad bellum construct.  See page 6 for sub-parts. 
  21
units, and the Yugoslav army razing villages and forcing residents to flee at an even more 
intense pace.48  At first then, it would appear that the bombing of Serbian facilities 
caused further genocide and thus the bombing was not warranted.  15 years later the 
NATO authorities are still in the Balkans in a peace-keeping role, and while there are no 
longer mass atrocities, there are still insurgents fighting for gridlines and country borders.  
The governing body of the 50,000 person peace-keeping force that still occupies the 
borders of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia should certainly be asking the 
question…was the intensified bombing in accordance with the tenet of proportionality?  
One certainly should take into consideration the idea that the Kosovo War was also an 
unjust one. 
 
F. GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
Terrorists serve to undermine the basic foundations Augustine and Aquinas 
referred to in fighting and waging war by removing order, justice and peace.49 The 
Terrorists in this Global War undermine the very notion of a moral code.  Terrorism sees 
the Globalized world in as its enemy…and seeks to undermine any system or 
combination of systems that are against it, further stating that terrorism is not in the 
majority, but the extreme minority. They have gone after Singapore and Hong Kong 
banks, which led the banks to implement retinal scan technology.50  Further, terrorists 
have struck Japan, UK, Spain, France and the US, to name only a few.51    The new 
challenge now lies in the actions of rogue actors instead of aggressive states, and Kosovo 
represented the beginning of this new war.  The concepts of victory and reasonable 
aspirations of success associated with countries laying down their arms, surrendering on 
battlefields, and negotiating terms to end all hostilities have all but vanished in today’s 
world.  Aquinas and Augustine placed supreme confidence in rationalism and its ability 
to win over the irrational.  This is simply not the case today.   
                                                 
48 Microsoft Encarta, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. 
49 Scheinin, Richard, When is a War Just?, San Jose Mercury News, Sep 22, 2001, p1F-2F. 
50 Yeo, Vivian, “Singapore Banks gear up for stronger authentication.” ZDNetAsia (August 8, 2005). 
51 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996, Patterns of Global Terrorism, April 1997, p1-75, DOS 
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Looking back at Saddam Hussein and the first Persian Gulf War, the self-defense 
clause in Jus ad bellum was used as the rationale to invade Iraq nearly 12 years later.  
After using nerve gas on his own people and Iran52, after invading another country and 
being ousted militarily, after agreeing to a truce that entailed following UN resolutions 
and an inspection regime, he had instead ignored the wishes of the international 
community and, for the four years prior to the Allied invasion in 2003, had been 
operating out of sight of federal inspectors.  There is a counterpoint to the above 
justification however; social order as envisioned in the 16th Century no longer applies.  
There no longer is a heavenly (meaning religious affiliation, particularly Christianity) 
order to things as there was in the original drafting of Just War Doctrine.  Instead, the 
United States and other Western nations are being asked by the non-globalized states to 
export hegemony of the Western lifestyle slowly to the rest of the world. The United 
States’ own Declaration of Independence lays out the framework: “That to secure these 
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive 
of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such 
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, 
indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light 
and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more 
disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the 
forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, 
pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute 
Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide 
new Guards for their future security.” 
After September 11, President Bush II vowed to preempt instead of react to 
threats from abroad.  For that reason, he began, with members of a coalition, namely the 
 
 
                                                 
52 McGinn, Paul R. "U.S. team substantiates Iraqi chemical weapon use." American Medical 
News 32.n9 (March 3, 1989):  
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United Kingdom, to pursue rogue actors and those countries that harbored terrorists.  In 
this new national security paradigm, four provisions of Just War Theory merit further 
discussion: 
Right Intention is prevalent53.   Intention on behalf of the western world is 
warranted in the securing of free trade and furthering international prosperity provided 
that denying safe haven of known terrorists, destroying existing training facilities, and 
demoralizing existing cells to promote safety of participants in the global marketplace is 
the common theme.   
Free trade protects peoples’ livelihood.  In effect, the security of a nation or many 
allows it to compete in the global marketplace, thereby generating a greater good for that 
marketplace.  But, in order to embrace that philosophy, nations and their citizens must 
feel safe and secure to operate.  The counterpoint is that mere revenge54 for grave 
atrocities to demonstrate military might is not a worthy or morally acceptable motive for 
military efforts. 
Justification in the Proportionality  tenet of Jus ad Bello is violated. Prolonged 
high altitude bombings in the vast wasteland of Afghanistan as winter approaches prevent 
food and supply lines from reaching millions of civilians and ensure more deaths by 
malnutrition during the cold months in a land already struck with 4 years of drought and 
low crop production.  A second point worth noting is that non-combatants must not be the 
direct targets of attack.  While it appears that great harm will come to the civilian 
populations, the loss of the few for the greater good of the masses will and can be an 
acceptable risk according to the Proportionality55 tenet.  
Just Cause and Humanitarian Intervention56 are evident.  This represents the 
classic insistence of Augustine:  “love may require force to protect the innocent.”  In a 
1992 presentation to the global community, Pope John Paul II cited “conscience of 
humanity and international humanity law” and claimed that nations and the international 
                                                 
53 Capitalized because this is a principle within the Jus ad bellum construct.  See page 6 for sub-parts. 
54 Cook, Martin L., Terrorism and ‘just war’, Christian Century, Nov 14, 2001, p22. 
55 Capitalized because this is a principle within the Jus ad bellum construct.  See page 6 for sub-parts. 
56 Ibid. 
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community have not only a right, but a duty of humanitarian intervention where “the 
survival of populations and entire ethnic groups are seriously compromised.”  The 
counterpoint is that the international community is already upholding its end of this 
bargain and first did so during the first Gulf War.  The international community provided 
safe haven for all the suppressed Kurds in Northern Iraq and Southern Turkey after 
Saddam Hussein’s genocidal campaign in 1988 that included weapons of mass 
destruction.57 Perhaps the gravity of the situation, e.g. risk versus benefit, and its possible 
effect on the United States and coalition partners is the reason that Sudan, Rwanda, 
Somalia and others are not the first to be responded to by the international community.  
Further, the ability to choose one and not the other is additional evidence that nations 
have not satisfied all tenets of Just War Theory and thus, within the last 100 years, Just 
War has not existed.  
                                                 
57 Gerard Powers, Robert Royal, George Hunsinger and Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, Would and 
Invasion of Iraq be a “Just War”?, United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Jan 2003, Pages 1-15. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Just War consists of three tenets: Jus ad bellum, Jus in Bello, and Jus post bellum.  
What Just War does not address and has never addressed is the issue of preemption, 
which is what the Bush Administration advocates.  The lessons of wars in the last century 
repeatedly teach that Just War Theory falls apart after Jus ad bellum.  Since this part of 
Just War Theory has never been adhered to, one must ask the pertinent question:  why 
stand by the theory at all?   
One can agree or disagree with the legitimacy of preemption; however, the 
evidence on Jus in Bello is a very compelling argument that Just War Theory has ceased 
to be followed as originally written.  This is not actually a great surprise since all tenets 
must be satisfied for a Just War to exist.  This theory was created to make addressing, 
committing and ending war the gravest of all man’s acts, so severe in nature that there is 
no room for error.   In fact, during the research of this thesis, a war that was fought justly 
according to tradition was not found.  And, because Just War Doctrine decreed that in 
order for a war to exist justly, all tenets must be followed, this thesis has provided 
considerable evidence that for the last 100 years Just War Doctrine has not been adhered 
to and with the changing dimensions of warfare by terrorists, state and rogue actors, and 
increased interconnectedness through Globalization, Just War may never be relevant as it 
was in the early years of establishment.  The changing and fluid dynamics of today’s 
asymmetrical threats raises the following question:  How do you square the ability to 
fight a war justly when, as a matter of fact, you presuppose an international arena in 
which justice no longer makes any sense? 
“Just War Theory is not an apology for any particular war, and it is not a 
renunciation of war itself.  It is designed to sustain a constant scrutiny and an immanent 
critique.”58 
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APPENDIX A. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
 
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF 




The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.  
 
Article 40 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the 
recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned 
to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures 
shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council 
shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.  
 
Article 41 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed 
to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such 
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.  
 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have 
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.  
 
Article 43 
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in 
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security.  
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of 
readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.  
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the 
Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between 
the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory 
states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.  
 
Article 44 
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented 
on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that 
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Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the 
employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.  
 
Article 45 
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately 
available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and 
degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the 
limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council 
with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.  
 
Article 46 
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the 
Military Staff Committee.  
 
Article 47 
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on 
all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the 
regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.  
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the 
Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently 
represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the 
efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in 
its work.  
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic 
direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to 
the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.  
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after 
consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.  
 
Article 48 
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by 
some of them, as the Security Council may determine.  
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through 
their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.  
 
Article 49 
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures 
decided upon by the Security Council.  
 
Article 50 
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, 
whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic 
problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security 





Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect 
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
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APPENDIX B. GENEVA AND HAGUE CONVENTIONS 
 
Hague Conference of 1907 
 
Hague I - Pacific Settlement of International Disputes : 18 October 1907  
Hague II - Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts : October 18, 
1907 
Hague III - Opening of Hostilities : 18 October 1907  
Hague IV - Laws and Customs of War on Land : 18 October 1907 
Hague V - Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land : 18 October 
1907 
Hague VI - Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities : 18 October 1907 
Hague VII - Conversion of Merchant Ships into War Ships : 18 October 1907 
Hague VIII - Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines : 18 October 1907 
Hague IX - Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War : 18 October 1907  
Hague X - Adaptation to Maritime War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention : 18 October 
1907 
Hague XI - Restrictions With Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War : 18 
October 1907 




1864 - Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded on the Field of Battle; August 22 
1928 - Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Gas, and for 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare; February 8 
1929 - Convention Between the United States of America and Other Powers, Relating to 
Prisoners of War; July 27 
1949 - Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, August 12 
1949 - Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12 
1949 - Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; August 12 
1949 - Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12 
1975 - Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
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